Senator Barack Obama’s decision to forego government financing in the presidential general election has been the cause of considerable consternation in some “reform” quarters. Some "reform" groups long supportive of tax financing of campaigns have been quite critical of the decision. At the same time, however, there is a broad perception that many reform organizations have chosen to go easy on Obama, on the grounds that the current tax-financing system is “broken,” and that Senator Obama cannot be blamed for remaining in a system that seems likely to substantially harm his chances for election. Others note that Obama is raising record amounts in small contributions, although truth be told he still gets most money from evil “bundlers” and/or in “large” contributions (if $1000 or $2300 can be called “large” in the context of a $500 million campaign), and this, too, is said to excuse his decision to use private, voluntary financing instead of taking the government subsidy.
Certainly the current tax-financing system for presidential campaigns could be improved (we’ll leave aside what it would mean to say the system is “improved” – my ideas may not always match the “reformers,” although sometimes they would). But I have previously taken issue with the description of the tax financing system as “broken.” In fact, it works as designed, right down to the low percentage of Americans who earmark tax dollars for the system (why have an earmark option if not to give citizens the ability not to earmark?) and the decision of candidates not to participate in the system (after all, the system’s constitutionality under existing precedent relies on participation being voluntary). The system is, at worst, “outdated,” not “broken,” but we ought to consider the very real possibility that it never really had much value, or much potential, and that other tax-financing systems will face the same hurdles.
That aside, how much credence should we give to the reform organizations’ argument that Senator Obama should not be held to participation, despite his claimed support for tax-financing, because the system is a) “broken;” b) participation would be contrary to his electoral interests?; and c) he raising lots of money in small contributions? Not much, I think.
This is not to say that the “reform” groups are insincere in thinking they have reason to give Obama a pass. But the reality is that every and any public financing system will favor some candidates vis a vis others.
"Reform" organizations are not exclusively, but they are generally, staffed with people who lean left in their politics. Some strive for objectivity and non-partisanship, and some do not, but even those that strive for objectivity and non-partisanship are likely to find their perception of the “fairness” or proper functioning of the system to be shaped by how it affects their preferred candidates. And I don’t really think any serious person familiar with the “reform movement” would challenge the notion that the preferred candidate of most staff, lobbyists, and executives in most “reform” organizations is the liberal Democratic “reformer,” Barack Obama.
In 1974, the current presidential tax-financing campaign system was introduced. As scholars such as Ray LaRaja and John Samples have demonstrated, it was developed specifically to help Democrats erase Republican campaign advantages that had become increasingly apparent in the presidential elections of 1968 and 1972. It was not designed to erase or equalize any Democratic campaign advantages. Republicans nevertheless participated in the system, because, under the law, at the time it seemed like the best option for them, even if not as good as the prior law of private financing. But there was no whining in “reform” circles that the system was “broken” merely because it gave an advantage to Democrats, or any suggestion that Republican non-participation could ever be excused in the interest of winning an election. Indeed, had such occurred – had Republican candidates opted out because it was in their electoral advantage to do so – it would most certainly have been held up as evidence of further need for a “fix,” as well as Republican “corruption.”
When Republican Steve Forbes opted out of the system in the 1996 primaries, because it was in his interest to do so, the “reform” Boston Globe editorialized that though the system, “has its flaws,” Forbes’ was “skewing the debate badly” and “abus[ing] the system.” (Jan. 16, 1996, p. 12). The New York Times noted many of the same criticisms of the system that reformers make this year, including its state by state limits in the primaries, that the amount of money allowed is too low, and that “soft money” raised and spent outside the candidates’ campaigns needed to be stopped. But that didn’t excuse Mr. Forbes, who was doing a “disservice” to the system. (Editorial, Feb. 6, 1996, p. A22). The Times was highly dismissive of any suggestion that Mr. Forbes’ surprising electoral success in early primaries was related at all to his message, attributing solely to “his idiosyncratic willingness to spend lavishly.” (Editorial, Feb. 29, 1996, p. A20). We won’t go through the litany – suffice it to say that the decision of George W. Bush to opt out of the primary system in 2000 gained no defenders in reform circles.
We can’t know, of course, what the response would be if the shoe were on the other foot this year – that is, if Senator Obama had decided to stick with tax financing while Senator McCain were opting out – but observers can be forgiven for suspecting that Senator McCain would be facing a barrage of criticism for the decision.
All of this takes us back to square one – tax financing of campaigns (or “public” financing, as its proponents prefer) is not neutral, and proposals to implement will not be designed to be neutral. Like the system now in place, they will in most cases be designed to favor one party (or at least one type of candidate) over others. Moreover, it will necessarily create the “appearance of favoritism,” something that is already an issue with regulatory and tax-financed schemes For example, while the current system probably does favor incumbents, and laws are likely to do so over time if not when enacted, the extent of that pro-incumbent bias – the “perception of incumbent protection” – is probably overstated in many quarters. This, of course, creates cynicism and loss of confidence in government – what the whole system is supposed to stop.
Meanwhile, when reformers say the system is “broken,” it’s not quite clear what they would fix, or how they would “fix” it. They have clearly decided that candidates need “more” money, although how much more isn’t very certain, and choosing any particular number seems a bit arbitrary, especially when many reformers continue to bemoan the amounts spent. Why aren’t the current amounts enough? Is it merely because candidates want to spend more? If that is the case, why should any amount set by a legislative process of compromise apply to all candidates, or any candidates? And why should a candidate be penalized (even if by rewarding their opponents with more dollars or higher contribution limits) if he or she spends more? If the problem is that some candidates want to spend more (clearly not all do – witness John McCain and John Edwards this year, among others) why should there be any limit? If there must be a limit, why should it be set at the level favored by “reform” organizations, rather than the level favored by someone else? Simply because of political power? But if that is the case – if it is just political power – then the “reform” organizations lose any moral standing when they challenge the outcome.
Some proposals have suggested that it should be harder for candidates to qualify for primary funds, although why that is a “problem” isn’t too clear, and if the idea is to help more candidates run for office, the proposal seems misguided. There is near uniform support for abolishing state by state limits in the primaries, although that may make the early primary states even more saturated with campaigning compared to later states, despite a disproportionality many reformers already bemoan. It is suggested that the general election grant not be tied to the formal nomination at the party conventions, but this would seem to open up a host of problems, including a lot of game playing on when a party might switch to its general election grant. The “clean elections” model of Arizona and Maine is sometimes held up as a model to emulate, though the programs seem to have failed to accomplish any of their stated goals.
