Testimony of David Keating Before the U.S. House Committee on House Administration on H.R. 1

For the People: Our American Democracy

PDF of testimony available here


Thank you Chairperson Lofgren, Ranking Minority Member Davis, and Members of the House Administration Committee for inviting me to testify today.

As you know, H.R. 1 is a massive piece of legislation, totaling 570 pages in length and altering or uprooting longstanding rules for virtually every piece of U.S. campaign, election, and government ethics law. Of necessity, therefore, I will focus my written statement on just a few portions of the bill. For the benefit of this Committee and members of the public, the Institute for Free Speech has produced detailed analyses on individual portions of this lengthy bill that affect free speech, and I have attached those analyses to these remarks and ask that they be considered part of my prepared testimony.[1]

Despite the “For the People” title of H.R. 1, the bill would, in fact, greatly harm the ability of the people to freely speak, publish, and organize into groups to advocate for better government. More appropriately labeled the “For the Politicians Act,” H.R. 1 would make radical changes to the long-held ability of Americans to speak and associate with other Americans on the issues about which they are passionate.

The bill would impose onerous and unworkable standards on the ability of Americans and groups of Americans to discuss the policy issues of the day with elected officials and the public.

Other sections of the bill would violate the privacy of advocacy groups and their supporters, stringently regulate political speech on the Internet, and compel speakers to include lengthy government-mandated messages in their communications.

H.R. 1 would radically transform interpretation and enforcement of the labyrinth of laws that regulate political speech, from its historic bipartisan structure to partisan control.

The proposal would also coerce Americans into funding the campaigns of candidates with which they may disagree in a system that research has proven hasn’t worked elsewhere. It would also inevitably lead to government subsidies for speech by bigots. These issues represent only the tip of the iceberg of what’s included in H.R. 1.

At its core, H.R. 1 would greatly increase the already onerous legal and administrative compliance costs, liability risk, and costs to donor and associational privacy for civic groups that speak about policy issues and politicians. Organizations will be further deterred from speaking or will have to divert additional resources away from their advocacy activities to pay for compliance staff and lawyers. Some groups will not be able to afford these costs or will violate the law unwittingly. The effect will be less speech by private citizens and organizations, allowing politicians to act with less accountability to public opinion and criticism.

One way to understand how H.R. 1 would harm nonprofit civic and advocacy groups is to apply its provisions to common advocacy and operating activities of these organizations. This complex and expansive bill has many provisions that are difficult for even campaign finance attorneys to understand. I will use my testimony to highlight some of these issues and their application to groups engaging in speech about policy issues.

H.R. 1 Would Make it Harder for Groups to Speak About the Federal Government

In addition to greatly expanding the scope of speech regulated by the government, portions of H.R. 1 are written so broadly that they would effectively ban speech by certain organizations under certain conditions. When speech isn’t banned, H.R. 1 will often require groups to swear their allegiance to candidates or sitting politicians (even when none exists), impose onerous disclaimers on a multitude of ads that violate the privacy of Americans who give to nonprofit groups, and effectively regulate all manner of online speech – including groups’ websites and social media accounts. The inevitable result will be less speech about public affairs and more money for attorneys.

● More Lawyers’ Fees and Government Regulations, Less Speech. H.R. 1 would vastly increase the legal compliance costs and risk for speaking about federal issues. Assuming groups can even afford to hire an attorney each time they wish to speak, paying more money to lawyers means fewer resources left to work for better government.

○ H.R. 1 would regulate a new category of speech – communications that “promote,” “attack,” “support,” or “oppose” (“PASO”) federal candidates and elected officials. Under this broad and vague standard, groups that merely speak about federal legislation or policy issues could be forced to file Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports that they didn’t have to file before.

○ To emphasize the point, the “promote,” “attack,” “support,” or “oppose” language (PASO) applies year-round, even in non-election years. It would give major headaches to any group that speaks on public issues. One huge headache is whether the speech would even be legal under the new coordination provisions in the bill.

Example: A government employees’ union desires to purchase a newspaper ad saying, “Government employees should not be held hostage to a border wall. It’s time to end the government shutdown.” Is that a statement “attacking” President Trump, since he is so clearly identified with a border wall? Suppose it referred to “Trump’s wall”? If that is a statement attacking Trump and it met the conduct standard regulating “coordination” in H.R. 1, the union would be banned from making such speech. This standard is discussed in-depth in our analysis of the bill’s expansive “coordination” restrictions.[2]

Example: Consider another possible ad. A group of Venezuelan émigrés, who are now naturalized U.S. citizens, take out an ad: “President Trump has recognized the new Interim Government of Venezuela. We thank the President for this action and ask all Americans to support the return of democracy to our country of birth.” Would the FEC deem that an ad “promoting” or “supporting” President Trump?

Example: An environmental group runs an ad that says the following: “Climate change is real. Call Senator X and urge him to start taking action on climate change.” Attack? How about a business group’s ad: “The Democrats’ tax hike would cost thousands of jobs in our state. Call Senator A, and ask him to vote ‘no’ on the job-killing tax bill.” Is that an attack? Some might deem it one, asking why the group would run the ad if the senator already planned to vote ‘no.’

○ Note that the PASO standard applies to any ad that can be seen in a candidate or officeholder’s district on the Internet or any other medium. Not only does it apply year-round, even in non-election years, but despite the deceptive name of the title of the coordination portion of the bill – “Stopping Super PAC-Candidate Coordination” – it applies to trade associations, unions, business groups, and advocacy organizations, such as Planned Parenthood and the National Right to Life Committee. It applies, it turns out, to almost every citizen or group of citizens that might want to comment on public life or candidates with one exception: the organized press. The Washington Post, CNN, Fox News Channel, and NPR can coordinate with candidates and spend all they want to speak out on any issue or election campaign. A nonprofit group’s blog, Twitter account, or Facebook page? It can’t.

● Compulsory Declarations of Allegiance. H.R. 1 would require groups speaking about legislative and policy issues to file FEC reports for “campaign-related disbursements.” These reports would be due even if the speech would have no impact on any election campaign and was made in a year without an election. Groups would be compelled to declare on those reports whether their speech “supports or opposes” any federal candidate or elected official mentioned in the communication, even if the group is merely supporting, opposing, or is neutral about the issue and takes no position on the candidate or elected official.

Example: A pro-choice group spends more than $10,000 on a radio ad calling on President Trump, Speaker Pelosi, and Senate Majority Leader McConnell to work together to protect abortion rights. Under H.R. 1’s broad and vague PASO standard, this ad may well be deemed a “campaign-related disbursement.” If that occurs, the group must declare on its FEC report whether it “supports” or “opposes” Trump, Pelosi, and McConnell, even if the group does neither.

● Longer Disclaimers, Less Speech, and Donor Deterrence.R. 1 would decrease the amount of speech that groups can engage in by increasing the length of mandatory government speech in their messages and requiring those messages to identify donors.

○ H.R. 1 would expand the length of the disclaimers for “independent expenditures,” “electioneering communications,” and the new category of regulated speech known as “campaign-related disbursements.” Many of the existing disclaimers in federal law are already too long. H.R. 1 would make this problem even worse.

○ H.R. 1 would additionally require groups to identify their top 5 donors of $10,000 or more in their disclaimers (or top 2 for audio-only ads), even if those donors gave money for purposes other than to fund the ad. This would divert attention away from a group’s message and toward its individual donors and members and worsen the politics of personal destruction and harassment. It would also lead many donors to cut off their financial support.

○ H.R. 1 would also require an organization’s CEO or highest-ranking official to personally appear and identify himself or herself and recite part of the disclaimer in audio and video ads. Again, this would leave less time in the communication for the message the group is trying to convey to the public.

Example: An environmental group sponsors a 30-second radio ad calling on President Trump to reduce air pollution. If it’s deemed a PASO ad, it must include the following 18-second disclaimer (the italicized portion must be read by the group’s president):

Paid for by Americans for the Environment, cleanenvironment.org. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee. I am Jane Doe, the President of Americans for the Environment and Americans for the Environment approves this message. Top two funders are FIRST NAME 1 LAST NAME 1 AND FIRST NAME 2 LAST NAME 2.

● Groups’ Websites and Facebook and Twitter Accounts May be Regulated by the FEC.R. 1 would regulate any online or social media communication if it is a “paid internet, or paid digital communication.” This is a clear departure from the FEC’s existing regulation of only paid online advertising.

○ Groups that use paid staff to post unpaid content on their own website or social media pages/feeds/channels could be subject to the disclaimer and reporting requirements discussed above if their content is regulated.

Example: Staff at a fiscal responsibility group post content on the group’s website and social media pages/feeds/channels about the voting records and positions of members of Congress on the budget deficit and national debt. The content is determined to PASO those members and must include FEC disclaimers. When the total value of the staff time exceeds $10,000 in a two-year period defined in the bill, the group is required to file the FEC reports discussed above.

● More Surveillance of Online and Social Media Communications. R. 1 would subject groups that spend as little as $500 on online ads to additional surveillance by government officials and opponents.

○ Large online platforms would have to maintain a publicly accessible database (“public file”) for any online advertising that costs more than $500 that addresses any “national legislative issue of public importance.” The public file must include a copy of the ad and details about how the ad was targeted and distributed, the rates that were charged, the candidates and issues that were discussed, and contact information and details about the person who ran the ad or the sponsoring group’s directors and officers.

○ The public file will assist antagonistic government officials and other opponents in keeping tabs on what individuals or civic and advocacy groups are doing online. It would also enable opponents of organizations’ views to take retaliatory actions.

Example: A local LGBTQ rights group in a very conservative state spends $500 on a small social media campaign urging removal of the ban on qualified transgender people serving in the military. The organization’s opponents use information in the public file to attack the group and urge employers of its officers and directors to fire those individuals.

● Speech Bans. H.R. 1 would define a large universe of speech as “coordinated” with federal candidates and elected officials, even if the speech is not, in fact, coordinated, and even if elected officials or candidates are not named in the communications. Such so-called “coordinated” speech about national issues would be banned if done by incorporated nonprofit groups or unions.

○ H.R. 1 would treat certain public communications as being “coordinated” with federal candidates or elected officials based on a broad range of conversations that groups may have with candidates, elected officials, or their staff. This includes discussions solely about policy and how to get the public involved.

○ Groups also could be deemed to be coordinating if their staff or vendors have certain prior relationships with candidates or elected officials in the small community of political vendors and consultants. Even a former summer intern who worked four years ago for a person who was later elected to Congress could trigger the ban.

○ As a result of H.R. 1’s expansive coordination standard, groups would be effectively prohibited from making many communications that:

■ Urge the election or defeat of candidates;
■ Refer to a candidate or elected official; or
■ Are deemed to “PASO” a candidate or elected official, even if the communication does not mention any candidate or elected official.

○ Directors and officers of groups could be held personally liable for coordination violations, which means many leaders or would-be leaders of nonprofit groups may simply resign or refuse to serve.

Example: A group advocating gun control meets with the chief of staff of Rep. Doe, who chairs a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, to discuss the Bipartisan Background Checks Act of 2019. The chief of staff suggests it would be helpful to shore up public and congressional support for the group’s agenda if the group ran a national PR campaign. The group retains a PR consultant who, unbeknownst to the group, worked on Rep. Doe’s unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign two years ago.

The group runs ads in all of the Committee members’ districts asking constituents to either thank their representatives for standing up for common sense gun control or to tell their representatives to support such reforms. The ads in Doe’s district cost $50,000. Under H.R. 1, the ad is deemed to be coordinated and would count as a contribution to Rep. Doe. Because the group is a nonprofit corporation, it may not contribute to any candidate, and the FEC fines the group at least $25,000 (the agency’s typical fine for prohibited contributions). Under the FEC’s customary practice, the group or Rep. Doe’s campaign committee also may be required to disgorge the $50,000 at issue to the U.S. Treasury.

H.R. 1 Would Intrude on Groups’ Donor and Associational Privacy 

H.R. 1 would require many nonprofit groups that simply speak about policy issues to publicly report the names and home addresses of many of their supporters to the government. This information would be stored in a publicly available government database where it would live in perpetuity. In many cases, the exposure of this information will facilitate harassment, threats, and intimidation and trample upon Americans’ long-held expectations and right to privacy in association.

● Violating Privacy in Association and Facilitating Harassment. H.R. 1 would compel groups to publicly identify certain of their donors on FEC reports if they spend more than $10,000 during a two-year election cycle on “campaign-related disbursements.” Keep in mind that “campaign-related disbursements” often have nothing to do with election campaigns. (This is in addition to the donor identification disclaimer requirements discussed above.)

○ A group’s donor list contains sensitive information that has long been protected under the law, except if a group is a PAC with the major purpose of election advocacy, or if donors give specifically to fund election advocacy.

○ Activists have been vilifying donors to policy and political organizations and calling for reprisals against them. If it became law, H.R. 1 would enable more of such activities and lead many donors to cut off their financial support for organizations.

Example: A taxpayer group is forced to identify certain of its donors on the group’s FEC reports for “campaign-related disbursements.” Opponents of the group’s policies gather at those donors’ homes and businesses, yelling offensive and threatening invectives at those donors and their families and calling for the donors to be fired from their jobs.

H.R. 1 Would Create a Speech Czar and Enable Partisan Enforcement

If you’re a Democrat, do you think Donald Trump should be able to appoint a campaign speech czar to determine and enforce the rules on political campaigns? And if you’re a Republican, would you have wanted those rules enforced by a partisan selected by Barack Obama?

Of course not. That’s why for over 40 years, Republicans and Democrats have agreed that campaign regulations should be enforced by an independent, bipartisan agency – the Federal Election Commission. The Watergate scandal that forced Richard Nixon to resign the presidency showed the dangers of allowing one party to use the power of government against the other.

As the late Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Ca.) warned during debate on legislation creating the agency, “We must not allow the FEC to become a tool for harassment by future imperial Presidents who may seek to repeat the abuses of Watergate. I understand and share the great concern expressed by some of our colleagues that the FEC has such a potential for abuse in our democratic society that the President should not be given power over the Commission.”[3] That concern led to Congressional adoption of the present method of selecting Commission members.

● Turning from Bipartisan Enforcement to Partisan Enforcement. H.R. 1 would transform the bipartisan, six-commissioner agency into a partisan, five-commissioner agency. It would give the FEC Chair broad powers to issue subpoenas without the support of any other commissioner, expand the agency general counsel’s powers to initiate investigations even without a vote of the commissioners, and weaken the rights of the accused.

○ No advocacy group would be safe from politically motivated investigations into federal advocacy activities that have any relation to the FEC’s jurisdiction.

Example: Opponents file a politically motivated FEC complaint against a civil rights group alleging illegal coordination with elected officials. The existing law establishes a six-member, bipartisan FEC (no party may have more than three commissioners) and requires a majority of commissioners (typically four) to approve investigations. But under H.R. 1, the FEC would be reduced to five members, with one of them being a nominal “independent,” who is likely to support one party over the other. Or the agency could have two vacancies and do anything it wants on a partisan vote. The FEC general counsel also would be able to issue subpoenas for the group’s communications and documents when only two of the five commissioners object.

Taxpayer-Financed Campaigns: A Record of Failure Forcing Americans to Subsidize Politicians’ Campaign Coffers

Finally, H.R. 1 would also institute an elaborate program through which the government would finance participating politicians’ election campaigns.[4] In particular, the bill would provide for the government to match contributions to politicians’ campaigns with $6 in tax money for every $1 contribution, up to the first $200 of a contribution. In some cases, the match can reach 9 to 1: nine dollars in tax money for every dollar donated.

As a matter of first principles, it is morally wrong that, if a donor contributes $1 to Donald Trump’s re-election campaign – or any candidate’s campaign – it forces those opposed to that candidate to contribute $6 or even $9 in public tax money to support that candidate and his or her dissemination of ideas those taxpayers may find abhorrent. But beyond these first principles, the idea has problems on its own terms.

One likely set of winners under tax-financed campaigns will be candidates who take extreme positions that appeal to small, concentrated groups of voters.[5] Rather than appealing to the middle of the electorate, a viable strategy may be to “play to the base” where supporters are more passionate – and partisan.[6]

Traditionally in American politics, political parties have been instrumental in candidate selection and have served as a moderating force overall. Parties have a large incentive to win and therefore want to nominate candidates who appeal to broad swaths of the American public and can win over swing voters. Political parties have used their fundraising apparatuses to favor candidates who fit this mold. Meanwhile, candidates who were viewed as extreme often received little support or funding from the party. While party support (or the lack thereof) didn’t always prevent these candidates from winning elections, the parties’ gatekeeping mechanism certainly provided a moderating function on the types of candidates who were nominated. Taxpayer financing of campaigns threatens to provide a final crushing blow to this important party role.

Consider how much more difficult it would be for political parties to raise money. What sensible donor would give $50 to a political party if she could give the same $50 to a candidate of that party and have taxpayers foot the bill for $300 or more to match it?

The subsidy will most likely drive donors away from the moderating forces exerted by parties and toward individual candidates. This will likely have the effect of further starving parties that were already hit hard by changes to campaign finance law in 2003.

The potential for tax-financing programs to incentivize polarizing and extreme candidates isn’t merely conjecture. The example of Thomas Lopez-Pierre’s recent campaign for New York City Council is instructive. In 2017, Lopez-Pierre campaigned for a City Council seat on the platform of making “greedy Jewish Landlords” pay.[7] Ultimately, Lopez-Pierre qualified for $99,000 in taxpayer dollars to help spread his hateful message.[8]

New Yorkers, including those on the City Council, were rightly appalled by Lopez-Pierre’s anti-Semitic message. Then-Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito said that to “have someone be able to spend [taxpayer dollars] to put forth that kind of a message is despicable.”[9] But under New York City’s matching fund system, there was nothing the City could do. The First Amendment prohibits laws from discriminating against individuals based on the content of their message. As such, if H.R. 1 is enacted, American taxpayers would be constitutionally required to fund the speech of all candidates that meet the qualifications for matching government funding – including those with racist, anti-Semitic, sexist, homophobic, transphobic, or otherwise hateful messages. As Lopez-Pierre’s campaign proves, this concern isn’t unfounded.

Supporters of taxpayer-financed campaign programs often argue that these programs will prevent corruption, but the record suggests otherwise. For a more comprehensive review of corruption in Arizona, Maine, and New York City’s tax-financing programs, please consult the Institute for Free Speech report, “Clean Elections and Scandal: Case Studies from Maine, Arizona, and New York City.”[10] Whether it’s embezzlement, fraud, bribery, personal use, forgery, or straw donor schemes, for any number of abuses, tax-financing programs have a history of corrupt actors exploiting the system for personal gain at the expense of hardworking American taxpayers. In general, wherever tax-financing has been enacted, abuses of these programs – and, by extension, taxpayer dollars – have followed.

It’s perhaps unsurprising tax-financing programs have a history of corruption in every jurisdiction in which they exist. In reality, these programs create new incentives for corrupt candidates – or corrupt staffers and campaign consultants – to cheat and defraud the taxpayers.[11] As just one example, Seattle, which had its first election with tax-financing in the form of the city’s “Democracy Vouchers” program in 2017, already saw its first allegations of fraud. A candidate for Seattle City Council was accused by her campaign manager of contributing her own money to the campaign and claiming it came instead from small donors.[12] This would have entitled her to $100,000 in public financing had she not been turned in by her former campaign manager (and defeated in the primary). Regardless of the outcome, the structure of the matching component of Seattle’s program is what incentivized that individual to commit fraud. As we’ve seen in Arizona, Maine, New York City, and elsewhere, Seattle is not an outlier in this regard.

Finally, the Institute for Free Speech has examined and debunked a number of theories about how tax-financing programs fail to meet the lofty standards promised by their supporters using evidence from existing programs around the country:

● Legislative voting behavior is unchanged when elected officials participate in tax-financing programs;[13]
● Tax financing fails to reduce lobbyist or special interest influence in government;[14]
● The diversity of occupational backgrounds of state legislators does not increase after implementing tax financing,[15] nor does the percentage of women legislators;[16]
● Giving money to politicians does not save taxpayer dollars in the long run;[17]
● Voter turnout fails to increase when states institute tax financing;[18] and
● Political competition against incumbent lawmakers does not improve in states with tax financing.[19]


H.R. 1 would institute sweeping new limitations on speech about campaigns and public affairs. It does so in a very complex, vague, and unintuitive manner. The provisions are so complex and open to so many possible interpretations that our analyses of the provisions may well understate the chill this legislation might place on speech.

These limitations would reach far beyond campaign speech to regulate discussion of legislative issues and public affairs. For advocacy groups, unions, and trade associations, several of the limits proposed in H.R. 1 would operate as a total ban on speech.

The first step towards fixing the many flaws in H.R. 1 is to split the bill into its component parts, so that it can be properly considered and amended. At that time, the speech portions of H.R. 1 will demand a significant rewrite that allows unfettered exchange of political information and policy discussion by U.S. citizens, respects the benefits of bipartisan campaign enforcement, and protects the First Amendment rights of all Americans. The best way to give the people a voice and to protect democracy is to protect and enhance the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Read the full testimony here.

[1] These analyses are also available on the Institute for Free Speech’s website. See Eric Wang, Analysis of H.R. 1 (Part One): “For the People Act” Replete with Provisions for the Politicians, Institute for Free Speech (Jan. 23, 2019), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-23_IFS-Analysis_US_HR-1_DISCLOSE-Honest-Ads-And-Stand-By-Every-Ad.pdf; Bradley A. Smith, Analysis of H.R. 1 (Part Two): Establishing a Campaign Speech Czar and Enabling Partisan Enforcement: An Altered FEC Structure Poses Risks to First Amendment Speech Rights, Institute for Free Speech (Jan. 31, 2019), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-31_IFS-Analysis_US_HR-1_Creating-A-Partisan-FEC.pdf; and Bradley A. Smith, Analysis of H.R. 1 (Part Three): New Restrictions Target Speech by All Groups Under the Guise of “Stopping Super PAC-Candidate Coordination,” Institute for Free Speech (Feb. 5, 2019), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-02-03_Smith-Analysis_US_HR-1_Coordination-Restrictions.pdf.

[2] See Bradley A. Smith, Analysis of H.R. 1 (Part Three): New Restrictions Target Speech by All Groups Under the Guise of “Stopping Super PAC-Candidate Coordination,” Institute for Free Speech (Feb. 5, 2019), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-02-03_Smith-Analysis_US_HR-1_Coordination-Restrictions.pdf.

[3] Legislative History of Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Federal Election Commission, at https://transition.fec.gov/pdf/legislative_hist/legislative_history_1976.pdf at 89.

[4] For a comprehensive examination of taxpayer-financed campaign programs and their record of failure at achieving goals set by their proponents, see Taxpayer-Financed Campaigns: A Costly and Failed Policy, Institute for Free Speech (Jul. 16, 2014), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-07-16_IFS-Policy-Primer_Taxpayer-Financed-Campaigns.pdf.

[5] See David Keating, H.R. 1’s Tax-Financing Program Could Increase Political Polarization, Institute for Free Speech (Jan. 17, 2019), at https://www.ifs.org/blog/h-r-1s-tax-financing-program-could-increase-political-polarization/.

[6] See Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization, Harvard University (Aug. 13, 2014), at http://www.andrewbenjaminhall.com/Hall_publicfunding.pdf.

[7] Editorial Board, Taxpayer-funded hate, thanks to the city campaign-finance system, New York Post (Mar. 3, 2017), at http://nypost.com/2017/03/03/taxpayer-funded-hate-thanks-to-the-city-campaign-finance-system/.

[8] Josh Nathan-Kazis, Candidate Who Condemned ‘Greedy Jewish Landlords’ Faces Uphill Election Bid,” Forward (Sept. 12, 2017), at https://forward.com/news/382466/candidate-who-condemned-greedy-jewish-landlords-faces-uphill-election-bid/.

[9] See note 7, supra.

[10] Matt Nese and Tom Swanson, Issue Review: Clean Elections and Scandal: Case Studies from Maine, Arizona, and New York City, Institute for Free Speech (Aug. 14, 2013), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2013-08-05_Issue-Review_Swanson_Clean-Elections-Scandal-Case-Studies-From-Maine-Arizona-And-New-York-City.pdf.

[11] See David Keating, H.R. 1’s Tax-Financing Program Creates New Incentives for Corruption, Institute for Free Speech (Feb. 5, 2019), at https://www.ifs.org/blog/h-r-1s-tax-financing-program-creates-new-incentives-for-corruption/.

[12] Bob Young, Seattle candidate accused of defrauding first-in-nation democracy-voucher program, The Seattle Times (Aug. 17, 2017), at https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/seattle-candidate-accused-of-defrauding-democracy-voucher-program/. H.R. 1 creates a “My Voice” Voucher pilot program modeled after Seattle’s “Democracy Voucher” program. See H.R. 1 § 5101.

[13] Jason Farrell, Sean Parnell, & Brett Sullivan, Issue Review: Meet the New Legislature, Same as the Old Legislature: A quantitative analysis of the Connecticut Citizens’ Election Program, Institute for Free Speech (Oct. 22, 2012), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Connecticut-Clean-Elections.pdf.

[14] Matt Nese and Luke Wachob, Issue Analysis No. 1: Do Taxpayer-Funded Campaigns Reduce Lobbyist and Special Interest Influence?, Institute for Free Speech (Aug. 14, 2013), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Issue-Analysis-1.pdf.

[15] Alex Cordell, Issue Analysis No. 2: Legislator Occupations – Change or Status Quo After Tax-Funded Campaigns?, Institute for Free Speech (Jun. 28, 2017), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2017-06-28_Issue-Analysis-2_Cordell_Legislator-Occupations-Change-Or-Status-Quo-After-Tax-Funded-Campaigns.pdf.

[16] Alex Cordell, Issue Analysis No. 3: Do Tax-Funded Campaigns Increase the Percentage of Women in State Legislatures?, Institute for Free Speech (Jul. 11, 2017), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2017-07-11_Issue-Analysis-3_Cordell_Do-Tax-Funded-Campaigns-Increase-The-Percentage-Of-Women-In-State-Legislatures.pdf.

[17] Matt Nese and Luke Wachob, Issue Analysis No. 4: Do Taxpayer-Funded Campaigns Actually Save Taxpayer Dollars?, Institute for Free Speech (Nov. 1, 2013), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013-11-19_Issue-Analysis-4_Do-Taxpayer-Funded-Campaign-Actually-Save-Taxpayer-Dollars.pdf.

[18] Luke Wachob, Issue Analysis No. 8: Do Taxpayer-Funded Campaigns Increase Voter Turnout?, Institute for Free Speech (Dec. 11, 2013), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2013-12-03_Issue-Analysis-8_Do-Taxpayer-Funded-Campaign-Increase-Voter-Turnout.pdf.

[19] Joe Albanese, Issue Analysis No. 10: Do Taxpayer-Funded Campaigns Increase Political Competitiveness?, Institute for Free Speech (Jun. 7, 2017), at https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017-06-05_Issue-Analysis-10_Albanese_Do-Taxpayer-Funded-Campaigns-Increase-Political-Competitiveness.pdf.

David Keating

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